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Helping, Doing, and the Grammar
of Complicity
DANIEL YEAGER
In the law a constant stream of actual cases, more novel and more tortuous than the mere imagination
could contrive, are brought up for decision-that is, formulae for docketing them must somehow be found.
Hence it is necessary first to be careful with, but also to be brutal with, to torture, to fake and to override,
ordinary language .... I
Introduction
This essay is about the grammatical' and, to a lesser
extent, moral aspects of the law of complicity, which
treats someone who helps someone else commit a crime
as though the helper himself committed the crime. The
point I hope to make here is similar to the one Professor
Phillip Johnson made about what he called "the unnec-
essary crime of conspiracy."3 In its current mode, com-
plicity too is unnecessary, but for better reasons, I think,
than Professor Johnson came up with for saying the
same about conspiracy.
Johnson suggested eliminating the crime of con-
spiracy by calling conspiracies "attempts," 4 a change of
description that is more than semantic. Attempting
entails trying. Conspiracies may demonstrate their mem-
bers' antisocial character, but by agreeing to kill some-
one tomorrow or next month the parties have no more
attempted or tried to commit murder than those who
engage to marry attempt to marry, or those who register
for a Bar Exam prep-course attempt to take the Bar
Exam. Professor Johnson forces his redescription of
conspiracy into the Model Penal Code's definition of
attempt which, even without his help, already makes a
paranoid fantasy out of what it means to attempt a
crime. Despite what the Code says, searching for a
victim,5 reconnoitering, 6 or possessing materials to be
used in crime7 are not part of the grammar of trying to
commit a crime; equally ungrammatical is Professor
Daniel Yeager is Associate Professor, California Western
School of Law, San Diego.
Johnson's claim that agreeing to commit a crime is try-
ing to commit a crime.
I am not concerned here with conspiracy, but with
complicity. My thesis is that in its current mode, where
someone encourages someone else to commit a crime,
complicity is unnecessary because it is redundant of
laws that criminalize solicitation (a request that some-
one else commit a crime)8 or conspiracy (where the re-
quested party agrees).9 Where complicity is not redun-
dant, that is, where the criminal idea does not originate
with the helper, or where there is no agreement to com-
mit a crime, I would redescribe complicity as an incho-
ate or risk-based, as opposed to consequence- or harm-
based, mode of criminality. This is because the essence
of complicity is not causal as to the principal or
perpetrator's offense, but relational as to the principal
offender, or simply expressive of the helper's antisocial
or dangerous character.1"
A decade ago, Paul Robinson," Sanford Kadish, 2
and Joshua Dressler" each wrote excellent pieces on
complicity, which before then had received little schol-
arly attention in America. In 1991, Oxford University
Press published Keith Smith's impressive one-volume
treatise, which presents Smith's views alongside centu-
ries of English thought on the topic. 4 None of these four
principal works or the work examined therein, includ-
ing that of criminal-law gurus George Fletcher and
Glanville Williams, sees complicity as a form of inchoate
liability. In the last quarter-century, three short articles
recommending such an approach have appeared in En-
glish law journals: two by Richard Buxton and one by
J.R. Spencer, both of whom focus more on the operation
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than on the meaning of complicity."5 The same can be
said of the English Law Commission, whose 150-page
consultation paper compresses into a few short para-
graphs the essence and logic of complicity. 6 The Model
Penal Code, too, hints at the inchoate nature of complic-
ity, but the Code's approach fails both grammatically
(someone who tries but fails to help robbery has perpe-
trated robbery),17 and thematically. By placing the com-
plicity provisions remote from the inchoate provisions,
and by sentencing complicit actors like perpetrators, not
like inchoate offenders, the Code's drafters demonstrate
that they saw complicity as only nominally inchoate or
risk-based.' So it is that space left in the complicity
oeuvre-at least that which is composed of theoreti-
cal accounts rather than "majority" and "minority"
rules of decision-that this essay attempts to fill.
Complicity's legitimacy rests on its demand that the
helper's contribution be significant enough to justify its
punishment, but not so significant, dominant, or ma-
nipulative as to altogether wipe out the responsibility of
the principal. Someone who helps or tries to help some-
one else commit a crime exerts somewhere from no, to
some, to too much constraint on his principal's autonomy
or spontaneity. Too much influence exerted by the helper
does not produce a case of complicity; rather, it pro-
duces a case of principal liability for the overreaching
helper in his agent's "innocent" wrongdoing. I address
this upper level of complicity in Part I. No influence, or
an insignificant amount of influence, does not describe a
case of complicity because the helper has not done
enough to see him as "causally" related to the principal's
offense. An example would be one party's oral solicita-
tion of a deaf principal or of a principal who is already
resolved to commit the solicited offense. Cases falling in
between, which are meant to be pure cases of complic-
ity, owe their existence entirely to the odd meaning
given to the word "cause" in this context. I criticize
these lower and core levels of complicity in Part II before
arguing in Part III for the reconceptualization of com-
plicity as a risk-, not harm-based offense.
I Principal Liability
Complicity rests on the premise that someone whom the
law interchangeably calls an accessory, accomplice, aider
and abettor, secondary party, or to whom I refer as a
helper in his principal's offense is derivatively, not vi-
cariously, liable for that offense. The difference between
derivative and vicarious liability is that, unlike vicari-
ous liability, derivative liability is based on the
defendant's own actions, not merely on his relationship
with someone else. Derivative liability and therefore
punishment is shared equally among principals and help-
ers. Proof of the helper's derivative liability is heavily
mediated by the conduct and attitude of the principal. If
the principal commits a crime, then equal credit goes to
the helper as well, 9 provided that the crime which oc-
curs is one the helper knew about and whose success the
helper intended when he provided his assistance.2'
But why? Is it as though the helper committed the
offense himself? Did he act through his principal? Cer-
tainly one can perform an action by getting others to
perform it. "We say, for example, 'Louis XIV built
Versailles,' even though the actual construction was not
done by him."2 Indeed, we can think of cases where the
principal is not a principal at all, but is simply, perhaps
metaphorically,' a tool, instrument, or means of some-
one else, such as when the helper recruits a lunatic or a
child to do the deed. But those cases involve, or should
involve, such coercion or manipulation of susceptible
parties that the agent's act is fishy enough to be called
not responsible or not spontaneous. Thus I find it
unimaginable, although the law does not, that my
providing a gun for a lunatic (I being unaware of his
incapacity) to use to assault someone makes the as-
sault mine and not his.2' For my agent's act to be
mine, I must act in a way that shows I see his act as
such; it would be ungrammatical to say someone could
"use" someone else inadvertently. Were I, for ex-
ample, to pay you to paint my house, it is not as
though I see myself painting the house-I see you
doing it. The only evidence of my seeing myself doing
it would be my placing such constraints on your au-
tonomy, or my knowingly exploiting your ex ante lack
of autonomy, that it ceases to be your spontaneous act.
Thus if I were to force or even gently ask my young
son to paint my house, then I have painted my house
through my son.
I likewise would act through you were I to hand
you a package into which I have secretly put a bomb
for delivery to a victim I have in mind, or were I to
place you under duress by threatening you with a
greater harm if you do not act on my behalf than if
Criminal Justice Ethics
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you do. A harder but still manageable case is where a
malicious felon places an innocent or a police officer
in circumstances where it is the innocent's right or the
officer's duty to apply deadly force to repel the felon's
threat of force, and the innocent or officer kills some-
one other than the malicious felon. 24 In such cases the
felon does not act through the innocent or officer be-
cause missing is the malicious felon's purpose to use
the killer. The felon's purpose is likely the opposite,
except in so-called "shield" cases (where a third party
is used by escaping suspects or those under siege as a
shield against police gun-fire),21 or in cases where one
felon sends an innocent or a confederate outside to a
certain death in order to facilitate the malicious felon's
escape. With such a bad purpose and excessive risk at
play, it is easy to see how in those cases we might
conclude that the felon acts through the "killer" to
deflect the justified use of deadly force away from
the felon and toward another target.
Commentators are skeptical about whether and
when someone can act through someone else. For
example, Professor Smith begins the sixteen pages he
devotes to the concept with the generally accepted
supposition that an originating actor or user's "mis-
conception of the quality of his own liability as being
secondary should not inhibit his conviction as a princi-
pal." 26 Thus a user who mistakenly believes his
agent to fully comprehend the situation is nonetheless
a principal.27 Smith then correctly rejects this supposi-
tion because innocent agency "intuitive[ly]" should be
linked only to "those cases where the principal has
consciously pursued an objective through the manipu-
lative use of an agent." 28 But from there Smith
concludes that the essence of innocent agency does not
include killing someone by commanding one's highly
trained mastiff to attack, or by recruiting a lunatic to
shoot or stab. 29 For Smith, Kadish, and Peter Alldridge,
these are cases of "causing harm," even though poi-
soning someone by way of a lunatic somehow is, at
least for Smith, a case of innocent agency. 0
I am not sure where that gets us, except in the case
of the mastiff, and even then, "causing" is the better
description only if by "agent" we mean "human" as
opposed to nonhuman "tools," "instruments," or
"means. " 31 As for infancy and lunacy, those defenses
point to conditions that negate responsibility, but not
necessarily will, volition, or choice. 32 Thus to call cases
involving infancy and lunacy cases of causing harm
does not necessarily improve upon our calling them
cases of acting through someone else. If need be,
philosophers of action could distinguish for us these
two ways of bringing about harm. They could ex-
plain how causing harm is a broader category than
perpetrating harm,33 how acts and their consequences
are distinct,34 and how causing harm, unlike perpe-
trating harm, is indifferent to the causal agent's in-
tention or purpose- that is, how causing can be inad-
vertent or merely mechanical whereas using cannot.
35
But why, when faced with questions of principal
liability, would we want to distinguish causing harm
from perpetrating harm? A category for causing
harm is necessary when the originating actor has not
acted through someone else. In all other cases, how-
ever, that category is useful only if we cannot identify
what it means to act through someone else. But there
are criteria for that determination. If innocent agency
or acting through someone else means anything, and
none of the commentators referred to above denies that
it does, then it is perfectly at home whether the agent is
a lunatic, a child, or someone duped as to material
facts, and whether the harm is committed by shoot-
ing, stabbing, or nonconsensual intercourse, provided
But why, when faced with questions
of principal liability, would we want
to distinguish causing harm from
perpetrating harm?
that the harmful act is orchestrated by a user who is
counting on the agent's susceptibility, incapacity, or
lack of responsibility.
I mention mistake as to the woman's nonconsent in
the context of a rape case because any serious student of
complicity must contribute his two cents on the renowned
Regina v. Cogan and Leak,3 6 in which Leak misled the
intoxicated Cogan into thinking Leak's wife wanted in-
tercourse with Cogan. Cogan's mistaken and therefore
"innocent" state of mind set him free, but Leak's guilty
state of mind made him the principal rapist of his wife,
even though he was exempt by law because of his status
as cohabitating husband, and even though it was Cogan,
not Leak, who penetrated Ms. Leak.
Applying what Professor Fletcher calls a "nar-
row" view of complicity, the English Court of Appeal
implied that Leak could not be an accessory to rape
unless Cogan was a principal rapist. If that were the
Winter/Spring 1996
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law, then neither Cogan nor Leak would be legally
accountable for the wrong, even though the court in-
sisted that "no one outside a court of law" would say
Ms. Leak was not raped.3 7 Professor Fletcher charac-
terizes this latter observation as the basis of a "broad"
theory of complicity that decouples the wrongfulness
of an act from its attribution to a particular actor.
Wrongfulness, the argument runs, can be considered
abstractly, without reference to the liability of the
perpetrator. Thus a helper can be liable for the wrong-
ful-but-excusable actions of his principal. By cover-
ing a principal's untoward actions or wrongs and not
just his crimes, the broad theory expands the scope of
derivative liability. Its virtue is its ability to obtain a
conviction in a hard case like Cogan & Leak, where
"[i]t is not clear whether Leak induced and exploited
Cogan's alleged mistake as to Ms. Leak's consent."38
Our acceptance of the broad theory, Professor Fletcher
points out, "would have the advantage of reserving
the notion of perpetration-by-means to cases in which
the party behind the scenes in fact dominates and
controls an 'innocent or irresponsible agent."' 39 Conse-
quently, the appellate court's articulated basis for hold-
ing Leak liable-that he had "procured" Cogan's un-
wanted penetration of Ms. Leak-was achieved by im-
pressing innocent agency into service on facts that in
Fletcher's view did not warrant it. Professors Curley
and Alldridge agree.4"
So does Professor Kadish.41 Kadish objects to the
appellate court's ruling in Cogan & Leak on the ground
that rape is a too-personal and thus "nonproxyable"
offense that cannot meet the demands of acting through
someone else. Kadish admits his grounds for objecting
are "wholly technical" or statutory, not conceptual.42
His point is that "[w]hat it means to be drunk and
disorderly, to marry, to have sexual intercourse, or to
escape from prison, is to do these things through one's
own person."43 Yet Kadish also admits that "[it does
not seem implausible to hold that a ground control com-
mander 'pilots' a plane when he "talks down" a
nonpilot in an emergency, or that a conductor "drives"
a bus when he encourages a six-year-old child to steer
the bus down a hill."44
Professor Kadish may be too brisk with what he calls
"our understanding of those actions." 4 His gripe with
what it means to act through someone else is determined
by the limitations of what he thinks it means to rape.
If, for example, it were not Cogan's penis that pen-
etrated Ms. Leak, but another foreign object, then I
assume Kadish no longer would call the action per-
sonal to the rapist and therefore nonproxyable. What
kind of law would say that rape occurs if Leak had
used a dildo, but not a penis? So too, is it really
obvious that someone who tunnels under a prison to
facilitate his insane lover's escape from prison has not
committed the offense of escaping from prison? Our
understanding of these actions depends only partly on
the wording of the statutes and jury instructions that
set out the elements of criminal offenses; the rest truly
So too, is it really obvious
that someone who tunnels
under a prison to facilitate his
insane lover's escape from
prison has not committed the
offense of escaping from prison?
is conceptual-dependent on the implications of words
as used in ordinary language.
It well may be that Leak imagined himself acting
through Cogan. To be sure, whether his misleading
Cogan is the type of restriction on Cogan's autonomy or
spontaneity that the law of principal liability wants to
recognize is not easily answered. Cogan & Leak is a far
cry from cases involving automatons or agents who
suffer from lunacy or infancy. It is not as though Leak
were influencing a child-a bundle of desires with a will
but no intelligence. Cogan & Leak is a difficult case, but
that does not mean we don't know what it means to act
through someone else. It means that we do: "We could
not recognize borderline cases of a concept as borderline
cases if we did not grasp the concept to begin with.""
If identifying Cogan & Leak as a borderline case means
sometimes culprits like Cogan and Leak should be ac-
quitted, then the law-not what it means to act through
someone else-really is "a ass." 47 It is only the most
crabbed definition or understanding of rape that could
excuse Cogan or exclude acts that occur by way of an-
other man's penis as opposed to some other object.
Cogan's indifference to Ms. Leak's desires should not
absolve him; he was more than inconsiderate not to
have first verified Mr. Leak's representations with
Ms. Leak, who at first tried to turn away from Cogan,
and sobbed from beginning to end.48 When faced
with such conflicting data, Cogan was brutish not to
desist.
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II Making a Difference to the Principal
Then in what way is it as though helpers who do not
coerce or manipulate their principals commit their prin-
cipals' offenses?49 The helper has merely helped. But
helping, say, burglary, is not committing burglary;
analytically, help can be withheld, or it wouldn't be
helping at all. Nor is helping burglary trying to
commit burglary, any more than "'argue' is equiva-
lent to 'try to convince', or 'warn' is equivalent to 'try to
alarm' or 'alert.' 5 10 Because helping crime is distinct
from committing the crime you're helping, complicity
mis-speaks by treating a helper as a principal.
The law nevertheless treats a helper as a principal so
long as the helper purposefully contributes to his
principal's offense. "Contribute" in this context is like
"cause," but not in its ordinary or what I call "strong"
sense that would be familiar to any first-year student of
torts. That familiar sense requires that a condition be a
sine qua non or at least a substantial factor in the occur-
rence in question.51 Indeed, cause in the context of the
law of complicity doesn't mean "cause" at all, although
some, like Professor Smith, characterize it as such.52 At
the least, a helper must render "actual" 3 aid that "mat-
tered," 4 "made a difference,"5 5 or even worse,
"presum[ably] caused 51 6 the principal's actions. Only
when the helper's actions "could not have been success-
ful in any case" is there no liability.5 7 And it takes such
an extended use of "cause" or "contribution" to support
the conclusion, for example, that lending a man a smock
to keep a battery victim's blood from staining the
batterer's suit made enough difference to the batterer to
justify our treating the smock-lender as a batterer;51 or,
that an angry judge's interception of a telegram might
have mattered in a murder because, had the victim re-
ceived the telegram, he might have anticipated the gun-
man behind him when three gunmen stood before him
and the crucial wire read, "Four men on horseback with
guns following. Look out." 9 Even a door opened for a
burglar "might possibly" make a difference to burglary
through the window. 60
Above I mention only exceptional examples; but
even essential cases of complicity, such as where a
helper lends his principal a crow bar for a burglary or
drives him to the situs of the crime, are not cases where
the helper has caused the offense (if "cause" is given
its customary meaning), even if, for example, the
principal cannot drive a car. So long as the principal
might have entered anyway, either with his own
crowbar or by other means, then why say "caused" or
the less objectionable "made a difference" if we mean
"helped" or perhaps more precisely, "tried to help"? 61
According to Smith, "cause" for purposes of complic-
ity covers "an event's exact occurrence, including time,
place, extent and type of harm, and so on." 62 Such an
extravagantly loose sense of cause furnishes the law
with a convenient way of passing through the myste-
rious workings of the principal, whom Professor
Kadish calls a "wild card" 63 whose will otherwise
poses "a barrier through which the causal inquiry
cannot penetrate."64 So we say it is as though the
helper committed the offense because it is as though
he caused the principal to commit it. Professor Paul
Gudel has called this type of linguistic move "illegiti-
mate" because it simultaneously uses a word in a
special or technical sense that need not conform to our
ordinary use of the word, while still trading on what we
normally mean by it.65 Gudel's criticism fits our use of
cause here. Moreover, the linguistic move he criticizes
excites but fails to address a fundamental question: What
difference does it make whether the helper makes a
difference?
Like Professor Kadish, Professor Dressler skips over
this question. Dressler would impose on the law of
complicity two modes of liability: causal and noncausal.
For him, "[a] causal accomplice is one but for whose acts
of assistance the social harm would not have occurred
when it did .... The noncausal accomplice, on the
other hand, renders unnecessary assistance." 66
Dressler's causal explanation covers all solicitors and
suppliers of hard-to-find skills and materials, and
even some that are not so hard to find.67 In fact, only
an otherwise superfluous helper whose opening a bank
door hastens a robbery by seconds does Dressler call
"noncausal," as opposed to one who hastens the job by
an hour, whom he calls "causal." 6 These are unsat-
isfying causal accounts, as they must be, to avoid
drifting into cases of principal liability. At one point
Professor Dressler concedes that noncausal assistance
is "[1]ike inchoate harm," 69 but he does not say how or
why he rejects that view for a view that uses simile to
describe the thing itself.
Like Dressler, Professor Robinson endorses a causal
account of complicity. Like me, Robinson sees com-
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plicity as a spectrum of influence that the helper
exerts on the principal's "degree of independent ac-
tion."7" We differ, however, in that his spectrum is
comparatively fine-grained and he, like Dressier, be-
lieves in the dilute sense of cause that really isn't
cause at all. Except for the would-be helper who
exerts no influence on his principal, each of the fol-
lowing helping-actions, whose degree of contribution
increases as the list goes on, is in Robinson's view
causally responsible for the principal's acts: 1) the
helper creates or helps create the situation where the
offense occurs; 2) the helper encourages but does not
otherwise aid his principal; 3) the helper facilitates the
offense with minor aid; 4) the helper's contribution to
the success of the venture is equal to that of the
principal; 5) the helper is the mastermind or moving
force behind the operation; 6) the helper causes the
crime by clever persuasion of an innocent agent; and 7)
the helper causes the crime by manipulating an innocent
dupe.71
Robinson's position on complicity is hard to pin down
because he directs most of his attention to the special
case of felony murder and the doctrines known as "varia-
tion" and "common purpose," which address the speci-
ficity of knowledge that a helper must have about the
offense or offenses his principal commits. But at least
one thing in Robinson's scheme is clear: he would not
treat a helper as if he committed the principal's of-
fense if the "causal connection" between the helper
and the principal's harm is "tenuous at best."' Less
clear is the extent to which cases of complicity are
"causal" in his, Dressler's, or anyone else's sense. If
I understand him correctly, Robinson uses "cause" in
a strong sense in what I've numbered 6 and 7-which
are cases of principal liability--and in its dilute sense
in all others, including the first, which he says in-
volves "causal responsibility" even though, oddly,
there is "no direct contribution to the conduct constitut-
ing the offense."73
Neither Dressler's nor Robinson's explanation is ad-
equate. Dressler tells us a bit more about what it means
to cause an offense, but he supplies too few examples to
illustrate his modes of causality (which sound
overinclusive) and noncausality (which sound
underinclusive). Robinson, on the other hand, without
telling us in what way an encourager, minor facilitator,
or creator of bad situations is causally related to the
offense, identifies seven categories of complicity, which
are not what he calls cases of "imputed liability," be-
cause of the presence of an essential causal connection
that is strongly causal only in the principal-liability cases
that comprise his last two categories.
III Complicity as an Inchoate or Risk-Based Offense
The resilience of this unusual use of "cause" may be
due to the nature of derivative liability. For the helper's
liability to flow backward from the principal's offense,
the helper must have had something to do with the
offense and not merely with the offender. The law of
complicity requires that the helper be connected to his
principal-since helpers must know the principal's pur-
pose and encourage or assist him---and to the offense,
since the helper must intend to facilitate and then cause
or make a difference in the principal's offense. This dual
role reflects two primary and shifting bases of criminal-
ity. The helper's relation to the principal reflects an
endangerment- or risk-basis of liability, and the helper's
relation to the crime reflects a consequence- or harm-
basis of liability.
I hesitate, however, to suggest that delineating the
risk or harm basis of complicity, "without more," could
iron out the wrinkles in the fabric of complicity. Crimi-
nal laws are meant to prevent and repair-meant at
once to deter and control those who pose future threats
of harm, and punish their past accomplishments of it.
Consider, for example, the law of attempt. At their
inception, laws that punish failed acts are risk-based:
any law that punishes failure at all is aimed at risk-
prevention. Yet something harmful does occur when
the actor has done his best to harm someone, though
his act misfires. Certainly a parent who discovers a
razor blade in his child's Halloween apple feels
harmed, though less so than he would were he less
vigilant.
As an illustration of the workings of harm and risk
rationales, consider California's law of attempt.74 That
law punishes nothing preparative, virtually nothing less
than a bungled or misfired action.7 Consequently, Cali-
fornia law reflects less concern for risk than does the
Model Penal Code, whose attempt provision punishes
even the slightest gesture toward crime. 76 At sentenc-
ing, California punishes attempts half as severely as
Criminal Justice Ethics
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completed offenses (which betokens a harm-orienta-
tion),7 whereas the Model Penal Code punishes most
attempts just like it does completed offenses (which
betokens a risk-orientation).8 But when it comes to
conspiracy, California's double-counting of the com-
pleted offense and the agreement is murderously risk-
based,79 while the Model Penal Code takes on a harm-
orientation by allowing convictions only for the com-
pleted offense or its underlying agreement, but not both.'
We could subject every criminal law or criminal-law
regime to a similar analysis, flipping harm and risk
rationales, which could do whatever work we want
them to. I do not care to do that here, but if I did, one
thing would remain constant: harm principles should
have little or nothing to do with the law of complicity.
The law does not see this, however. It is hornbook
law that the helper plays a dual role in crime-he is
both dependent or parasitic on the principal's criminal
acts and is independently criminal in his own right.
When it comes to demonstrating his connection to the
crime that his principal commits, the law requires only
scant proof, or it invokes the language of causation,
although again I believe the language of helping or
trying to help could perform this task more grammati-
cally than can that of causation in its loose sense. If
the law of complicity were not concerned with harm,
then it would be indifferent to the presence or absence
of cause on the helper's part. But not only does
complicity concern itself with harm; it is more con-
cerned with harm than with crime. I say this because
under the popularized broad view of complicity, most
defensive matters that may exculpate a principal
are characterized as wrongful-but-forgivable
excuses-arguably even defenses that do no more
than expose an ill-advised or overcharged case-which
benefit only or remain personal to the principal.8 1
This is a heavy tax laid on the helper, but it does leave
intact the baseline assumption that a helper's liability is
mediated and immediate at once. It is mediated in that
the helper must help what he knows his principal wants
to do. It is immediate in that, if their jointly desired
harm occurs, however innocently on the principal's part
(typically because he lacks the requisite guilty state of
mind), then it is as though the helper committed a crime
that, paradoxically, is not a crime at all. So viewed,
liability is derivative not so much of criminality, but of
harmful results, even those that are brought about by
innocent or unconvictable principals. Thus it is more the
helper's association with harm than with criminals at
which the law of complicity strikes.
This state of affairs may express our belief that
someone who helps an innocent wrongdoer is just the
sort of person with whom the criminal law should
concern itself. I share that belief, but only because the
helper, with the requisite bad attitude, has associated
himself with another's criminal purpose, which may
or may not succeed. Granted, the success of the
principal excites greater indignation than does a fail-
ure. But fixating on success or harm demands our
reliance on a flimsy, rhetorical sense of cause, even
when it is redescribed by Professor Kadish as not so
much "cause," but "making a difference." Our in-
stincts are correct about the propriety of punishing the
helper, but our instincts are flawed if they divert our
attention to the harm, which might have nothing that
can be demonstrated, or nothing whatsoever, to do
with the helper. The helper is an excessive risk-taker
whose subjective, not manifest criminality, to lift a
term from George Fletcher,82 is what warrants pun-
ishment, regardless of whether his aid or encourage-
ment informs or merely glances off of his principal.
Criminal associations tend to succeed more than solo
ventures do; and while I agree with Professor Dressler
that whether or not this is true poses a complicated and
untravelled empirical question,83 absent evidence that
too many cooks really do spoil the broth, 4 there is
nothing wrong with treating criminal associations as
though they create excessive risks of manifest crimi-
nality. It is sound social policy to discourage criminal
associations, to "give credit where credit is due-not
merely to the ringleader-but to the ring" as well.8
But we go too far when we conclude that, because
helpers' help tends to help, helping is just like doing.
It isn't. Again, because the relation of helping (unlike
doing) to the ultimate harm is synthetic, not analytic,
the actions are distinct and should be so treated.8 6
I hope the law is not like it is simply to avoid prob-
lems in separating principals from helpers. I know
those problems were in part what long ago led Parlia-
ment and Congress to invent new procedures for pros-
ecuting helpers. But if the current status of complicity
is symptomatic of our indignation at behind-the-scenes
masterminds in gaming, counterfeiting, prostitution,
drug manufacturing, "building Versailles," and other
far-flung enterprises that rely on hierarchy and division
of labor, then this indignation only expresses that we
think "game," "counterfeit," "sell sex," "manufacture
drugs," and "build Versailles" describe actors and
acts that the law does not. To answer who the real
perpetrator is in these cases would require thorough
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knowledge of the enterprise, of who really has a stake
in the outcome, of who, if anyone, exercises hege-
mony over the act (again to borrow from Professor
Fletcher),88 and whether we think, for instance, that
an underling's running a printing press is what we
mean by counterfeiting as opposed to helping counter-
feiting. Making these hard calls is part of judging,
informing them is part of lawyering, and being sub-
ject to them is part of being a criminal defendant who
treads into areas of questionable legality. Maybe I
would find saying any of this unnecessary were
indeterminate sentencing still the norm, but I doubt it.
If we know who the real principal is, then his
helpers are punishable for one reason only: with an
attitude more antisocial than that of indifference they,
by associating themselves with a criminal venture,
increase the risk of criminality by bolstering or enlight-
ening someone with encouragement, information, or
materials. It is not as though they haven't done
anything; they have done something that we should
denounce. Because of the limits of the grammar of
helping, they are not attempting or trying to commit
the principal crime; what they have done may be
better described as inciting or soliciting, counseling,
conspiring, facilitating, aiding and abetting, or at-
tempting to do the same. By any other name, funda-
mentally, complicity is a more risk- than harm-based
Complicity is a more risk- than
harm-based form of liability, and to
see it as such follows naturally from
our recognizing the grammatical
if not the moral distinctions
between helping and doing.
form of liability, and to see it as such follows natu-
rally from our recognizing the grammatical if not the
moral distinctions between helping and doing.
I am not the first to recognize the possibility of
complicity's inchoateness; but I am one of the first to
take it seriously. In a single paragraph of his 87-page
article, Professor Kadish says that "it would [not] be
incongruous to apply the concept of attempt to complic-
ity, thereby converting it to a doctrine of inchoate
liability."89 He then points out that a number of
American jurisdictions have done just that, though
only where the principal follows through and commits
a crime.90 Glanville Williams also recognizes the
possibility, but for him the matter is "of little more
than technical interest" wherever the punishments for
inchoate and completed offenses are equally severe.9 1
Although Professor Smith finds non-causal explana-
tions for complicity to be theoretically inadequate,92 he
mentions, without elaborating, that "inchoate liability's
functions and rationale must.., be drawn into any
reassessment and restructuring of complicity." 93 But
the only use he finds for inchoate liability is to pave
the way for his causal account of complicity. That
account does not follow or include a reassessment of
complicity, but finds a rationale for it in its current
state. Because complicity requires the occurrence of a
harm to attribute to the helper, and because complicity
practically if not formally punishes helpers less se-
verely than principals, Smith argues, complicity is not
inchoate. 94
In 1969, Professor Buxton introduced the argument I
make here: "Where the accused gives aid or furnishes
materials preparatory to the commission of the principal
offence he does the guilty act which the law seeks to
forbid at that time, and . . only by great artificiality of
reasoning can his culpability be related to subsequent
actions by the perpetrator." 95 Four years later, he pressed
the English Law Commission to take his advice, which
finally it has, although without attribution.9 6 Buxton
would punt the requirement that a principal offense
occur. The benefits of such an alteration, he posits,
would be the same as any risk-based crime, plus a sepa-
rate crime of complicity would tighten up what he saw
as the wildly uncertain scope of laws against solicitation
and conspiracy.97 Neither Buxton nor his successor,
Spencer, has much further to say on point; the same can
be said of the Law Commission, despite its lengthy con-
sultation paper.
Professor Fletcher, too, refers to the potentially in-
choate nature of complicity. After observing that gener-
ally the helper "contributes either advice or material
aid, but he does not -cause' the primary perpetrator to
commit the offense," 98 Fletcher explains the Model Penal
Code's unsuccessful-helper provision with the drafters'
singular justification: "[W]hether the aid is actually
rendered is fortuitous; the actor is equally culpable and
his dangerousness is equally great if the perpetrator
never receives the aid."99 Fletcher properly rejects clas-
sifying unsuccessful helpers as attempters of the ob-
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ject offense because their actions are too preparative
and because it is the principal's actions, not the ulti-
mate harm, at which a helper's help is pitched. Fletcher
then rejects classifying unsuccessful helpers as suc-
cessfully complicit because to do so would create an
anomaly whereby behavior too preparative for at-
tempt would be punished as severely as a completed
offense; this, he says, would "tak[e] the principle of
subjective liability to its logical extreme." 10 But from
there he decouples unsuccessful aid from solicitations
that fail to move the requested party into action. His
point is that a failed request poses a greater threat
than failed aid and thus approaches, but still is not, a
criminal attempt."10
Fletcher is correct in resisting the inflation of at-
tempt laws, but wrong to limit his objections to unsuc-
cessful as opposed to successful acts of complicity. I
agree that helping a principal is not attempting the
principal's crime; it is help that may or may not
further the principal's goals.10 2 For the reasons I
stated earlier, a solicitation may be punishable on its
own, but not because it is an attempt or is even like an
attempt.'0 3 It is neither. If, for example, I ask you to
try to score a basket against Michael Jordan, it would
be ungrammatical for me to say (provided that you
are not merely my means), "I tried to score against
Jordan." I have encouraged you to try to score against
him. We could, however, and I do, say that all
complicit acts, successful or not, are too mediated by
the principal to be treated like attempted or completed
object offenses. Yet Fletcher says: "That the acces-
sory actually contributes to the commission of the crime
is part of what it means to be an accessory. There is
no social wrong in acting to aid the crime of another,
unless the aid actually furthers the criminal objective
or strengthens the resolve of the perpetrator."'0 4 Re-
ally? Professor Fletcher's own excellent analyses of
patterns of subjective criminality, by themselves,
would lead an attentive reader to dismiss this claim
out of hand. How much punishment an excessive
risk-taker (as opposed to harm-causer) deserves is a
separate and more familiar issue, which is taken up
elsewhere in some excellent discussions, including
his.05 I am not suggesting that trying to help or
helping is morally identical or adjacent to
perpetrating a crime (how could it be?), just that
neither type of action is grammatically anything like
perpetrating harm.
Conclusion
In this essay I have tried to uncover some of the one who helps a murderer himself a murderer. By
weaknesses, if not the pointlessness, of causal and yoking together dissimilar modes of criminality the
causal-like arguments that claim to connect the helper law of complicity not only is needlessly ungrammati-
to his principal's acts and not just to his principal. Just cal, 1°7 but it ignores its essentially inchoate founda-
as an infelicitous solicitor "without more" is not a tions, and consequently skirts the law's responsibility
conspirator (never mind what the Model Penal Code of making careful, refined, graded, even nuanced
says),0 6 a conspirator is not a murderer, nor is some- distinctions about action, responsibility, and blame.
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